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INDEPENDENT INVENTION AS A DEFENSE
TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Samson Vermont*
Under current law, independent invention is no defense to patent infringe-
ment. This Article argues that independent invention should be a defense,
provided the independent inventor creates the invention before receiving
actual or constructive notice that someone else already created it. The de-
fense reduces wasteful duplication of effort and enhances dissemination of
inventions without lowering the incentive to invent below the necessary
minimum. To be sure, the defense lowers the incentive for inventions that
face significant odds of being invented by more than one inventor By ena-
bling a second inventor to compete with a first inventor the defense
essentially breaks up the first inventor's patent monopoly into a duopoly.
Monopoly profits exceed the collective profits of duopoly. Thus, from the
perspective of inventors ex ante the defense reduces the expected profit for
inventions that could be invented by more than one inventor This Article
argues, however that the reduction in expected profit is moderate and that
the reduced expected profit is generally sufficient. Per Bayes' theorem, the
fact that an invention could be invented by more than one inventor is itself
evidence that a moderately reduced expected profit will still motivate at
least one inventor to create the invention without inefficient delay.
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INTRODUCTION
Many scholars who study intellectual property (IP) argue that we should
tailor rights in IP so that they provide protection only when output of IP
would clearly be too low without protection.' This argument rests on a vari-
ant of one of the following three claims.
First, the last bit of supra-competitive pricing by a monopolist provides
disproportionately small profit to the monopolist in comparison to its social
cost.2 For example, lowering by 10% the price of an invention charged under
a patent monopoly might reduce the patentee's profit by only 1% while
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 9-10, 21-24 (2003).
2. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Inno-
vation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 985 (1999); see also Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social Benefits and Costs of the Patent
System Stack Up in Pharmaceuticals?, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75 (2004). This logic applies equally
to tangible property.
3. "Patent monopoly" is convenient shorthand for a certain degree of market monopoly. A
patent seldom confers a complete market monopoly over a good or service. See Kenneth W. Dam,
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reducing the social costs of the patent monopoly by 19%.4 This suggests that
the optimal patent monopoly falls short of providing complete exclusivity
over the invention.5
Second, property rights serve two related functions: they provide (i) a
way of determining who gets what when; and (ii) an incentive to create or
6improve the what. For rights in IP, however, function (i) is perverse-
because IP is largely non-rivalrous. We cannot both drive the same car to
different places, but we can both use the same invention to build different
machines and we can both simultaneously read different copies of the same
book. This suggests that the case for rights in IP is weaker than the case for
rights in tangible property.7
Third, IP engenders higher rent dissipation and transaction costs than
tangible property does.' This too suggests that the case for rights in IP is
weaker than the case for rights in tangible property.
These three claims are more or less sound. By themselves, they counsel
in favor of erring on the side of under-rewarding invention. But they do not
tell the whole story. The other part of the story is that once in a while an
invention provides net benefits to society that astronomically exceed the net
benefits to the inventor. Consider the polio vaccine. The benefits to the in-
ventor, Jonas Salk, consisted of fame, gratification, and relatively modest
financial gain. The social benefits consisted of millions of saved lives. No
particular piece of tangible property can compete with the polio vaccine
when it comes to the size of the gap between the net social benefits and the
net private benefits to the owner or creator. Indeed, it is tempting to con-
clude that the social benefits of the polio vaccine exceed the combined
social costs of every invention and IP right that has ever existed. This may
The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247 (1994); see also LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 1, at 22-23; John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Prop-
erty, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 54-55 (2004).
4. These figures are based on a simple linear model. Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 2, at
990 tbl.i. Gifford presents a model that suggests the last bit of supra-competitive pricing is even
more disproportionately costly in the normal case in which demand is concave. See Gifford, supra
note 2, at 106.
5. See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 2, at 989.
6. DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAw's ORDER 138-39 (2000).
7. See Michele Boldrin & David Levine, IER Lawrence Klein Lecture: The Case
Against Intellectual Monopoly (Mar. 28, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/papers/klein-paper.pdf [hereinafter Boldrin & Levine, Monopoly]; Michele
Boldrin & David Levine, The Case Against Intellectual Property, 92 AM. EcON. REV. 209 (2002);
Danny Quah, 24/7 Competitive Innovation (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Working Paper No. 1218,
2002), available at http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/dquah/p/0204-247.pdf.
8. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 12-18. The material costs tend to be much
higher in the former case. The difference "argues for less extensive propertization of intellectual
than of physical property." Id. at 8; see also Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent
Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005); Edmund W. Kitch, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A
Reply, 23 J.L. & ECON. 205 (1980); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observa-
tions on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 374 (1992) ("A substantial literature
documents the steep transaction costs of technology licensing...."); cf. Yoram Barzel, Some Falla-
cies in the Interpretation of Information Costs, 20 J.L. & EcON. 291, 292 (1977) (arguing that high
transaction costs are the cause of high rent dissipation).
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also be true for inventions such as the smallpox vaccine, penicillin, and the
pesticide DDT. (By preventing malaria, DDT reputedly saved hundreds of
millions of lives.9) Nor are such great gaps between social and private bene-
fit exclusive to inventions in health and medicine. Other super socially
valuable inventions include the light bulb, telephone, combustion engine,
airplane, television, transistor, and integrated circuit.
Would these super socially valuable inventions have ever been created
and put to use had they been entitled to weaker patent protection? The an-
swer is almost certainly yes. Super socially valuable inventions are precisely
the inventions that are likely to be produced even in the total absence of pat-
ent protection. Weaker patent protection, however, might have delayed some
of them. Weaker patent protection implies lower expected revenue for the in-
ventor. An inventor will not pursue an invention unless her expected revenue
exceeds her expected costs of invention. The costs of invention fall with
time. (Inventing the polio vaccine today, for example, would not require the
Herculean effort it required in the 1940s.) Thus, to weaken patent protection
is to increase the risk that inventors will postpone invention.
Many IP scholars seem to believe that we can often get something for
next to nothing-that by scaling back patent protection we can often mark-
edly decrease its social costs without markedly increasing the risk of
missing out on or postponing invention. Actually, we can get something for
next to nothing, but the opportunities to do so are scarce. To find these op-
portunities, we must identify the inventions for which scaling back patent
protection would avoid disproportionately high social cost or would pose
disproportionately low risk of under-rewarding inventors. This paper identi-
fies a class of inventions that can satisfy this requirement: inventions that
face significant odds of being invented by more than one inventor at roughly
the same time.
Under current U.S. law, the second to invent generally comes up empty
handed. Suppose inventor Smith and inventor Jones toil away for years in
separate efforts to build a better mousetrap. They conceive of essentially the
same design but Smith does so a few months after Jones. Smith and Jones
separately perfect the design, file for patents, and then start commercializing
the mousetrap. Under U.S. law, only inventor Jones will receive a valid pat-
ent. As soon as Jones's patent issues (usually two to three years after its
filing date), Smith can no longer make, use, or sell the mousetrap unless
Smith acquires a license from Jones.
This type of neck-and-neck finish is common. Researchers frequently
converge on the same idea at roughly the same time.'0 Famous examples
9. See COMM. ON RESEARCH IN THE LIFE Sci., NAT'L ACAD. OF Sci., THE LIFE SCIENCES:
RECENT PROGRESS AND APPLICATION TO HUMAN AFFAIRS 432 (1970) (asserting that DDT saved
500 million lives); see also J. Gordon Edwards & Steven J. Milloy, 100 Things You Should Know
About DDT, http://www.junkscience.com/ddtfaq.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2006).
10. See Eugene Garfield, Multiple Independent Discovery & Creativity in Science, CURRENT
COMMENTS (Inst. for Scientific Info., Phila., Pa.), reprinted in 4 ESSAYS OF AN INFORMATION SCIEN-
TIST 660 (Eugene Garfield ed., 1981); D. LAMB & S.M. EASTON, MULTIPLE DISCOVERY: THE
PATTERN OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS (1984); WILLIAM FIELDING OGBURN, SOCIAL CHANGE 90-122
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include the light bulb (Edison and Swann), the telephone (Bell and Gray),
the integrated circuit (Kilby and Noyce), calculus (Newton and Leibniz), the
periodic table (Mendeleyev and Meyer), the telegraph (Morse, Henry, and
Cooke and Wheatstone), the telescope (Hans Lippershey, Drebbel, Fontana,
Jansen, Metius, and Galileo-each claiming they invented it in 1608 or
1609)," and certain facets of the theory of relativity (Einstein and Poin-
car6). 2 Some historians and philosophers of science believe convergence is
the rule rather than the exception."
A crucial claim of this paper is that convergence is evidence that a smaller
reward would have been sufficient to incentivize the invention. This claim
rests on Bayes' theorem, which tells us how to revise an estimated probability
in light of new information. 4 For our purposes, the estimated probability in
question is the probability that complete patent protection, meaning the stan-
dard protection conferred under current law, provides an excessive reward for
a given invention. A reward is excessive when it exceeds the minimum neces-
sary to incentivize timely creation of the invention. The new information in
question-the information we use to revise the estimated probability-is the
number of inventors who create the invention, that is, the number of inventors
who invent the same invention. If no inventor ever creates the invention, the
probability is very low that complete protection provides an excessive reward
for the invention. If exactly one inventor creates the invention, the probability
is higher but still not high overall. If two or more inventors independently cre-
ate the invention at about the same time (convergence), the probability of an
excessive reward is high overall.
Therefore, I argue, in a case in which two or more independent inventors
converge on an invention, the patent protection available for that invention
should be ratcheted down moderately. A good way to ratchet down protection
moderately is to automatically bestow a defense to patent infringement on
the independent inventor(s) not entitled to the patent.
(1922); Jerry Gaston, Secretiveness and Competition for Priority of Discovery in Physics, 9 Mi-
NERVA 472 (1971); Robert K. Merton, Singletons and Multiples in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter
in the Sociology of Science, 105 PROc. AM. PHIL. Soc'Y 470 (1961); William F. Ogbum & Dorothy
Thomas, Are Inventions Inevitable? 37 POL. Sci. Q. 83 (1922). One study showed that 46% of re-
searchers believed they had been anticipated once or twice in their career, and an additional 16%
believed they had been anticipated at least three times. See Warren 0. Hagstrom, Competition in
Science, 39 AM. Soc. R. 1, 3 (1974). These figures agree with theoretical models of multiple discov-
ery. Garfield, supra.
II. See LAMB & EASTON, supra note 10, at 145.
12. Poincar6 formulated (but did not interpret) the exact equivalent of E = ic2 slightly be-
fore Einstein did. See Tony Rothman, Lost in Einstein's Shadow, 94 AM. SCIENTIST 112 (2006).
13. See, e.g., LAMB & EASTON, supra note 10; Merton, supra note 10.
14. The probability of event A "conditional on"-meaning given the occurrence of--event B
generally differs from the probability of event B conditional on event A. Yet, there is a definite
relationship between these two probabilities, and Bayes' theorem is an expression of that
relationship, which is: Pr(AIB) = Pr(A) Pr(BIA) / Pr(B), or, the probability of event A conditional on
event B equals the product of the unconditional probability of event A and the probability of event B
conditional on event A, divided by the unconditional probability of event B. In place of "event A"
and "event B," one can substitute "hypothesis A" and "data B," thereby bringing into relief the
central insight of Bayes' theorem, which is that a hypothesis is supported by data that is more likely
to appear when the hypothesis is true than when the hypothesis is false.
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Hereinafter, this proposed defense is referred to as the "reinvention de-
fense" or simply the "defense." Inventions for which the probability of
reinvention is significant-or for which the probability of reinvention would
be significant were it not for the law's adoption of the reinvention defense-
are referred to as "reinventables." The independent inventor not entitled to
the patent is referred to as the "reinventor." Although the second inventor is
occasionally entitled to the patent under U.S. law, 5 and although more than
two independent inventors may be entitled to assert the reinvention defense,
"reinventor" is used interchangeably with "second inventor," and "patentee"
is used interchangeably with "first inventor," unless stated otherwise. To
avoid vague pronoun references, the reinventor/second inventor is referred
to as a "he" and the patentee/first inventor is referred to as a "she." Also re-
ferred to as a "she" is an inventor at the ex ante stage who is yet neither a
reinventor/second inventor nor a patentee/first inventor.
Part I discusses the literature most relevant to the reinvention defense.
Part II characterizes a version of the defense that would work best in the real
world. Part III establishes a test to evaluate the overall desirability of the
defense. Part IV, the heart of the paper, aims to show that the defense passes
this test, arguing that the defense reduces system costs markedly while re-
ducing the incentive to invent only moderately. Finally, Part V discusses
four objections to the defense and concludes that none of them are espe-
cially troubling.
I. PREVIOUS COMMENTARY
A. Long's Theory of Information Costs
Unlike a patent, a copyright provides no protection against independent
creation of a copyrighted work, and a trade secret provides no protection
against independent discovery. Clarisa Long attempts to explain the patent
law difference in terms of the "information cost profile" of patents.16 IP
rights protect information. It is costly to produce information worthy of such
protection, but the costs of producing protected information are not the costs
Long has in mind. She has in mind the costs of information about protected
information.17 Costs of information about protected information include the
15. The second inventor may be entitled to the patent if the first inventor "abandoned, sup-
pressed, or concealed" the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000). In other words, the second inventor
may be entitled to the patent if the first inventor does not publish, commercialize, or file for a patent
on the invention at some point before the second inventor files for a patent on it. However, the courts
will seldom presume abandonment, suppression, or concealment, unless it appears the first inventor
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed for several uninterrupted years. Also, the first inventor can
overcome the presumption by showing that she was working to perfect the invention. See generally
Lutzker v. Plet, 843 F2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1988); cf Kyla Harriel, Prior User Rights in A First-To-
Invent Patent System: Why Not?, 36 IDEA 543, 550 (1996); see also Karl F. Jorda, The Rights of the
First Inventor-Trade Secret User as Against Those of the Second Inventor-Patentee (Part II), 61 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 593, 600 (1979).
16. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465 (2004).
17. Id. at 467 n.5, 480.
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costs of identifying the boundaries of protected information and the nature
of its protection. These costs are borne by potential owners, infringers, and
licensees," and by the courts and administrative agencies.
In copyright, Long argues, the defense of independent creation econo-
mizes on these information costs by rendering it unnecessary for an author
to determine whether the expressive work she plans to create is covered by
another author's copyright. This cost savings outweighs the social costs aris-
ing from the defense's negligible reduction in the incentive to create
expressive works.'9
In patent law, a reinvention defense would confer only modest savings in
information costs, savings that would, Long argues, likely be outweighed by
the costs of the defense's reduction in the incentive to invent. 2° Under cur-
rent law, when a firm invents something on its own, the firm cannot assume
it is free to embark on commercial development. Before embarking, the firm
will typically ask patent counsel to prepare a "freedom to operate" or
"clearance" opinion, which consists of a comprehensive search for and de-
tailed analysis of patents that may cover the invention. A reinvention
defense would mitigate the need for and the complexity of these costly opin-
ions, but the savings would be modest for three reasons.
First, compared to copyrights, the number of patents through which a
potential infringer must search is small, and the class of parties who must
search patents is relatively small." That class is limited to the types of firms
likely to be sued for patent infringement, i.e., sophisticated firms that spe-
cialize in the technology in question. The average Joe could not infringe the
typical patent if his life depended on it, whereas anybody can copy a copy-
righted work.
Second, patents are easier to search than copyrighted works because
patents must be applied for, the applications and resulting patents have a
uniform format, they are organized into predetermined classes, and they are
published in keyword-searchable databases. The fact that it is even possible
to search patents by keyword goes to the heart of the difference in the in-
formation cost profiles of patent versus copyright. Inventions can be
described in words because they are functional in nature, whereas the inef-
fable nature of expressive works often makes them harder to describe than
to create in the first place."
Third, patent rights are easier to cognize than copyrights because patent
rights cannot be parsed." Unlike a copyright, a patent does not cover sub-parts of the whole. If a patent claims an invention with elements A, B, C,
18. See id. at 468, 490-95.
19. Id. at 528-29; see also id. at 469-70, 511-12,517-27.
20. Id. at 528-29, 532; see also id. at 517-27.
21. Id. at 469, 487-89, 502-05, 509.
22. Id. at 469, 487-88, 508-09.
23. Id. at 510-11.
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and D, a firm that practices only one, two, or three of the elements does not
infringe the patent. A firm must practice all four to infringe.
Long's argument-that the reinvention defense would at best confer
only modest savings in information costs-is essentially sound. Yet, her ar-
gument neither explains nor justifies the absence of the defense from patent
law. For one thing, her argument ignores savings in costs other than infor-
mation costs. Her argument also presumes, contrary to the argument of this
paper, that the defense would unduly lower the incentive to invent.
B. Reinvention Defense for Concealable Inventions
Economists Stephen Maurer, Suzanne Scotchmer, Elisabetta Ottoz, and
Franco Cugno conclude that a reinvention defense would discourage waste-
ful patent races while lowering inventors' profits to levels commensurate
24
with their costs of invention. I agree with this conclusion, but the models
on which these economists base it do not for the most part speak to pat-
entable inventions. The models purport to ask and answer the following
question: when will a potential reinventor choose to incur the costs of rein-
venting a patented invention rather than to license it from the patentee?25
The answers generated by the models suggest that giving the potential rein-
ventor the ability to make this choice-by shielding him from liability if he
does so-would enhance social welfare.
The problem with the models is that they assume a potential reinventor
can evaluate a patented invention and still invent independently. Seldom can
a potential reinventor evaluate a patented invention and still invent it inde-
pendently.26 In practice, learning that a patented invention exists usually
coincides with learning how to replicate it. For one thing, the patent explains
how to make and use the invention. Also, in most cases the key elements of
the patented invention can be readily ascertained by examining the commer-
cial product that embodies it.
As such, the models are really models of trade secrecy rather than mod-
els of patent protection. The models speak only to inventions for which trade
secrecy is suitable, that is, inventions that can be commercially exploited
and kept secret at the same time, such as a manufacturing process that can-
not be reverse-engineered through examination of the manufactured
product.2" With respect to such inventions, the models demonstrate that rein-
24. Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in Intellec-
tual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002); Elisabetta Ottoz & Franco Cugno, The Independent
Invention Defence in a Cournot Duopoly Model, ECON. BULL., June 20, 2004, at 1,
http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2004/volumel2/EB-04L10005A.pdf; see also James J. Anton
& Dennis A. Yao, Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights,
84 AM. EON. REv. 190 (1994).
25. Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 24, at 537; Ottoz & Cugno, supra note 24.
26. See also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Pat-
ent Law, 17 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 799, 813-20 (2002) (listing additional problems with the Maurer-
Scotchmer model).
27. See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 6-7; Heald, supra note 8.
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ventors should be exempt from liability. Thus the models confirm the wis-
dom of the long-standing rule that trade secrets do not protect against
reinvention. With respect to inventions that must rely on patent (i.e., inven-
tions that cannot be commercially exploited and kept secret at the same
time), the models are largely irrelevant.
C. User Rights
In countries that recognize prior user rights, the patent goes to the first to
file the application as opposed to the first to invent. Typically, a prior user is
defined as an inventor who commercialized the invention, or made substan-
tial preparations to do so, before the patentee filed the application. 8 Prior
user rights enable the prior user to continue commercializing the invention
in the same manner and to the same extent that she had commercialized it,
or had prepared to, before the patentee filed the application.
Economist Carl Shapiro explores the welfare effects of a stylized version
of prior user rights. Under his model, two inventors pursue an invention
and create it simultaneously. Thus, his model ignores the issue of which
inventor filed the application first and which created the invention slightly
before or after the other. This effectively removes the "prior" from "prior
user rights," leaving "user rights."
Under his model, the law either recognizes or does not recognize user
rights. If the law does not recognize user rights, one of the inventors always
obtains a monopoly on the invention. If the law recognizes user rights, a
duopoly always results. The ex post benefits of user rights are straightfor-
ward, assuming social welfare under duopoly exceeds social welfare under
monopoly. The model also shows that user rights confer ex ante benefits,
assuming the competition under duopoly is not too sharp. Shapiro concludes
as follows:
[U]ser rights will automatically reduce the rewards precisely for those in-
ventions with a high profit-to-cost ratio, since these are the inventions most
likely to be discovered simultaneously. These are also the inventions that
the patent system is most likely to overreward. From a Bayesian perspec-
tive, the fact that an invention was discovered independently by two or
more parties is evidence that the profit-to-cost ratio for that invention was
28. See, e.g., Tokkyoh [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 79 (Japan) (non-exclusive
license by virtue of prior use).
29. Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 Am. EcON. REV. 92 (2006). The United States rec-
ognized prior user rights for part of the nineteenth century. See Patent Act of 1839, ch.88, § 7, 5
Stat. 353 (establishing prior user rights later revoked in the Patent Act of 1952); see also Harriel,
supra note 15, at 550. Currently, the United States recognizes only a very limited form of prior user
rights for inventions covered by business methods. See 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000). Not only must the
prior user have used the business method commercially in the United States before the application
was filed, she must have done so at least one year before the application was filed. In most cases
where these criteria are satisfied, prior user rights are unnecessary because the patent in question is
invalid for lack of novelty. Id. § 102.
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relatively high, so reducing the reward based on market power is attrac-
tive. 0
In addition, Shapiro points out that user rights mitigate the bias in R&D
toward overly similar research projects. That is, by reducing the expected
return for achieving the same invention as someone else, user rights encour-
age firms to pursue more diverse research projects, which is good, provided
R&D is, as theory suggests, too similar in market equilibrium.'
Note that Shapiro's user rights lack certain features of the reinvention
defense advocated herein. The reinvention defense does not, for instance,
confer the same rights on the first inventor and the second inventor. Never-
theless, Shapiro's main argument for user rights supports the reinvention
defense. At bottom, his main argument is also my main argument.
Shapiro's only reservation about user rights is that they may encourage
first inventors to keep their inventions secret. Though Shapiro's main argu-
ment applies to the reinvention defense, his reservation does not. As
discussed in Section IV.A.2, the reinvention defense would, overall, discour-
age first inventors from keeping their inventions secret. Indeed, the defense
would create a strong incentive for first inventors to disclose their inventions
to the public as soon as possible.
Of the few papers relevant to the reinvention defense, only Shapiro's is
on track. And his fleshes out none of the key contours of a reinvention de-
fense that would work in the real world. Part II (below) fleshes out those
contours.
II. FEATURES OF THE REINVENTION DEFENSE
A. The Thoughts and Acts That Constitute Reinvention
There appears to be no reason why the thoughts and acts that constitute
a reinvention should differ from the thoughts and acts long recognized as
constituting a first invention: independent conception of the invention and
independent reduction of it to practice. In other words, a reinventor must
come up with the idea for the invention on his own and get the invention
into workable form on his own.
30. Shapiro, supra note 29, at 4.
31. Theory suggests firms pursue projects that are "overly correlated." See generally Lufs
Cabral, Bias in Market R&D Portfolios, 12 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 533 (1994); Partha Dasgupta, The
Welfare Economics of Knowledge Production, 4 OXFORD REV. EcON. POL'Y 8 (1988); Partha Das-
gupta & Eric Maskin, The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios, 97 EcON. J. 581 (1987); Joseph
Zeira, Innovation, Patent Races, and Endogenous Growth (Kennedy Sch. of Gov't Faculty
Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. RWP02-047, 2002), available at http://
ksgnotesl.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP02-047/$File/rwpO2 047 zeira.pdf. The reason
is the same reason there is excessive entry of firms into patent races-society cares only about getting
the most useful inventions at the least cost, whereas firms care only about maximizing their individual
gains. Thus, individual firms do not care if the number of firms pursuing an invention that is a rela-
tively "sure thing" from a technological standpoint is non-optimally high.
32. See, e.g., Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 592-94 (1881); Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74
U.S. 583, 602-03 (1868); Pitts v. Hall, 19 F. Cas. 754 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 11,192).
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B. One Patent per Invention
In copyright, independent creators can get their own copyrights for
works previously copyrighted by others. Should reinventors be able to get
their own patents for inventions previously patented by others? No. Allow-
ing reinventors to get separate patents would require changes in the law that
would upset numerous settled patent doctrines. For example, it would require
changes at odds with the novelty requirement, which is as fundamental to pat-
ent law as consideration is to contract law. It would also require changes that
would undermine the widely accepted notion that a patent confers only the
right to exclude others from practicing the invention rather than the affirma-
tive right to practice the invention.
In addition, allowing reinventors to get separate patents could unduly
reduce incentives to pursue reinventables. If the reduction in incentives is to
be moderate, inventors must believe ex ante that there is a fair chance that
convergence on the same invention will give rise to a Cournot duopoly that
maintains prices above the competitive level.33 As discussed later, a Cournot
duopoly cannot persist without some inequality between the reinventor and
the patentee. Thus, awarding them equal patent rights would undermine
their ex ante prospect of Cournot duopoly.
Also, allowing reinventors to get separate patents would increase uncer-
tainty in the market for inventions. No one could be sure whether or when a
reinventor's patent might suddenly issue from the Patent Office and thereby
markedly alter the value and exclusivity conferred by the first inventor's
patent and licenses thereto. The Patent Office keeps applications secret for
at least eighteen months after they are filed. It publishes most of them at
eighteen months, but an applicant who is willing to forego patent protection
in foreign countries can instruct the Patent Office to delay publication until
the application issues as a patent. The delay between filing and issuance
34
ranges from approximately thirty-four to forty-three months. However, an
applicant who wants to can delay issuance indefinitely by, for instance, fil-
ing one continuation application after another.
C. When Reinvention Must Occur
As mentioned earlier, it is impossible for a potential reinventor to learn
about the details of an invention and then reinvent it independently. There-
fore, the defense cannot be available to a purported reinventor who received
actual notice of the details before purportedly reinventing.
What about constructive notice? The law tends to regard constructive
notice as sufficient when proving that the intended recipient received actual
33. A Cournot duopoly forms when two firms that produce homogeneous goods compete
against each other but at least one of the firms cannot increase output freely and other firms are
barred from entry.
34. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of
Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REv. 2099, 2101, 2118 (2000); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley,
Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 237 (1998).
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notice is difficult. Suppose a first inventor's application is published and
another party sees it (actual notice). How could the first inventor prove that
this other party, who purports to be a reinventor, saw the application and
used it as an instruction manual to copy the invention?
The law also tends to regard constructive notice as sufficient when re-
quiring actual notice would encourage would-be recipients to cultivate
ignorance. Requiring actual notice would discourage potential legitimate
reinventors from reading patents, scientific journals, and other sources of
information that might notify them of a prior invention and thereby shut
their reinvention window. As well as retarding the flow of information,
requiring actual notice would generate high costs in cases in which the first
inventor is unsure who the potential reinventors are. To cover her bases, the
first inventor would have to send registered letters to numerous irrelevant
parties who would waste time and money ascertaining the significance of
the letters.
Therefore, first inventors should have the option to provide constructive
notice through publication instead of or in addition to providing actual no-
tice. When a first inventor provides both, a reinventor should not qualify for
the defense unless he reinvents before receiving the earlier of the two. No-
tice must, however, be sufficient. Actual notice should be considered
sufficient if it "enables" the invention, which means it includes a disclosure
that teaches a person of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the
invention. This is the criterion under current law for what prior art must
teach in order to invalidate a patent.35
Constructive notice could be considered sufficient for purposes of the
defense if, in addition to enabling the invention, the disclosure was pub-
lished in good faith rather than in a manner designed to avoid giving actual
36
notice to potential reinventors. This is not the very liberal standard that
defines publication for prior art purposes. To qualify as published for prior
art purposes, a disclosure need not appear in a mainstream source or even in
English. Instead, a disclosure is deemed published for prior art purposes
when it is made publicly accessible in principle. For example, one copy of a
doctoral thesis in a library somewhere in the world qualifies as published
prior art as long as a member of the public could have obtained access to it
without much trouble.37
If that standard were the standard for what counts as constructive notice
sufficient to shut the reinvention window, first inventors could shut the rein-
vention window for potential legitimate reinventors without really disclosing
35. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
36. Admittedly, it might be difficult for courts to distinguish between bad faith publication
that does not shut the reinvention window and good faith publication that does. If this proves to be
the case, a better rule might be that only a published patent application dispositively shuts the rein-
vention window; any other form of publication merely creates a rebuttable presumption that it has
shut the window. The presumption is rebutted if the reinventor shows that the first inventor could
have published the invention at lower or equivalent cost in a manner that would have notified a
substantially larger portion of the relevant public.
37. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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the invention to the relevant public. For example, immediately after achiev-
ing the invention, a first inventor could "publish" it where no one would see
it by posting a disclosure for one week on an obscure page of an obscure
website. Such strategic behavior could nullify the reinvention defense.
Thus, the standard for what qualifies as publication for purposes of con-
structive notice should probably be stricter than the standard for what
qualifies as publication for purposes of prior art. Publication that would
likely satisfy the standard for purposes of constructive notice includes Eng-
lish-language publication in an issued patent, a published patent application,
publication in a mainstream scientific journal, or publication via presenta-
tion at a conference open to the relevant public. Note that, even with the
stricter standard, an unavoidable evil of letting constructive notice shut the
reinvention window is that legitimate reinventors who look for but never see
the first inventor's good faith publication will nonetheless lose the defense if
they fail to complete reinvention before the date of that publication.38
D. First Inventor as Reinventor
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), the second inventor may be entitled to the
patent on the invention if the first inventor forgoes patent protection in favor
of trade secrecy.39 Under current law, the second inventor's patent bars such
a first inventor from continuing to practice the invention. The question
arises: if the reinvention defense is adopted, should first inventors who
maintain inventions as trade secrets be entitled to assert the defense against
second inventors' patents? Probably not. If these first inventors were entitled
to assert the defense, it would encourage them (relative to the status quo) to
elect trade secrecy over patent-it would assure them they could continue
practicing their inventions even if second inventors later obtained patents.
This would partially undermine the defense's overall tendency (discussed in
Section IV.A.2) to discourage secrecy among inventors.
To obviate this problem, the rule could be that only second inventors can
assert the defense. Or, the rule could be that a first inventor can assert the
38. What if the reinventor comes up with the basic idea for the invention ("conception")
before the first inventor's publication, but does not get the invention into workable form ("reduction
to practice") until after that publication? The normal rule in patent law is that one's date of invention
is one's date of conception, provided one was continually diligent in one's efforts to reduce the
invention to practice throughout the time between conception and reduction. For example, inventor
A, who conceives an invention in, say, 2005, and reduces it to a working prototype in 2008, has an
earlier date of invention than inventor B, who conceives the same invention in 2006 and reduces it to
a working prototype in 2007-provided inventor A was consistently diligent in her efforts to reduce
the invention to a working prototype between 2005 and 2008. Adoption of the reinvention defense
will not change this rule, a rule that governs who qualifies as the first inventor. A different rule,
however, may have to govern who qualifies as a reinventor. Conceiving of an invention is often
easier and cheaper than reducing it to practice. Thus, it may be wise to insist that a reinventor qual-
ify for the defense only if he both conceives of the invention and reduces it to practice before
receiving notice of the prior invention.
39. § 102(g) bars a later inventor from patenting an invention only if the first inventor "had
not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed" the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000) (emphasis
added). If the first inventor had abandoned, suppressed, or concealed the invention, a later inventor
can patent it, provided the later inventor satisfies all the other requirements of patentability.
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defense only if she did not maintain the invention as a trade secret. Either
rule would work. However, the latter rule, which could be modeled on 35
U.S.C. § 102(g), is probably superior. The former rule would cause some
upheaval in the law if the United States later changed over to a first-to-file
system.
E. Transferability
As a rule, transferability of rights is a prerequisite of efficiency. Rights
in inventions are generally subject to this rule. Inventors commonly license
or assign rights in their inventions to other parties who can better commer-
cialize and enforce those rights. Indeed, small inventors and companies that
specialize in inventing (so-called "invention factories") would be ruined if
they were unable to transfer their rights in inventions.
It is not clear, however, that unlimited transferability of the reinvention
defense is efficient. Specifically, it is not clear whether the reinventor should
be able to license out the defense ("unlimited transferability") or whether
the reinventor should only be able to assign it in its entirety to a single party
("limited transferability"). The question of which transferability regime is
best implicates numerous tradeoffs among interrelated variables. 40 No de-
finitive answer to this question is forthcoming. There are reasons to believe,
however, that a limited-transferability regime is best overall. With limited
transferability, only one party can possess the defense at any given time.4 ,
Keeping the defense in the hands of a single party prevents the defense from
increasing-or at least from markedly increasing-uncertainty, transaction
costs, and fragmentation of rights in the market for inventions.42 As dis-
40. Three examples of the variables include (1) the extent to which the reinventor's ability to
license out the defense would reduce the expected reward for invention relative to the expected
reward if reinventors could not license out; (2) the extent to which the reinventor's ability to license
out would increase the information costs to all parties of determining who holds what rights to in-
ventions and what those rights entail; and (3) the extent to which the reinventor's inability to license
out would bias R&D toward industries-such as software--that rely heavily on licensing to end
users.
41. An exception would be if there were more than one timely reinventor. For example, if
each of two inventors reinvented the invention before the first inventor or the other reinventor issued
notice, then both reinventors would possess the defense.
42. It is easy to overuse the argument that a doctrine will increase uncertainty, transaction
costs, or fragmentation of rights. The argument can be (but seldom is) made against many long-
standing patent doctrines. Undoubtedly, if one of these doctrines did not already exist and some
commentator proposed that it be adopted into law, other commentators would raise the argument.
Consider, for instance, the shop rights doctrine, which is similar to the reinvention defense in some
ways. Under the shop rights doctrine, an employer is entitled to free use of an invention made by an
employee on company time or with company resources. Shop rights do not prevent the employee
from patenting the invention and licensing it to other firms. Shop rights merely allow the employer
to avoid paying a royalty. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933);
Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TEcH. 1, 4-7
(1999). The shop rights doctrine is well accepted and uncontroversial. Yet, if the shop rights doctrine
did not exist and some commentator proposed that it be adopted into law, other commentators could
easily argue that it would increase uncertainty, transaction costs, or fragmentation of rights. The
argument is virtually unfalsifiable unless and until the doctrine is adopted and its actual effects are
assessed.
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cussed later, prohibiting the reinventor from licensing out the defense to
multiple parties also helps secure the inequality between reinventor and pat-
entee that is necessary to maintain Coumot duopoly.
Now that we have tentatively established the main contours of the de-
fense, we must establish a framework in which to evaluate its overall
desirability. Part III establishes this framework.
III. FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING THE REINVENTION DEFENSE
The patent system should stimulate creation of inventions for which the
social benefits exceed the social costs. The social costs of an invention con-
sist of (1) the unavoidable R&D costs inherent in overcoming the technical
challenge of achieving the invention; (2) any negative externalities resulting
from use of the invention (e.g., those of nuclear technology); and (3) the
costs of providing patent protection for the invention. This paper focuses on
the costs of providing patent protection, which are referred to as "system
costs."
Lowering system costs is tricky because system costs are the flipside of
the incentive to invent. Lowering system costs tends to lower the incentive
to invent, and raising the incentive to invent tends to raise system costs. In
other words, system costs are the price we pay to provide the incentive to
invent, and the more incentive to invent we provide, the higher the price
tends to be.
Nevertheless, there are bargains to be had: First, different ways of pro-
viding the same amount of incentive can impose different amounts of
system CoStS. 43 Second, small reductions in the amount of incentive some-
times result in large reductions in the amounts of system costs. Third, even
when a reduction in incentive exceeds the concomitant reduction in system
costs, the reduced incentive may suffice to stimulate invention. Note that the
incentive need not be proportional to the social value of the invention." All
that is required to incentivize invention is that an inventor's expected reve-
nue exceed his costs of invention (including his opportunity costs). Ideally,
we would never provide more than this minimum incentive. The more the
incentive exceeds this minimum, the more we incur system costs without
commensurate gain.
Our test for assessing the desirability of the reinvention defense boils
down to asking: does the defense decrease system costs more than it in-
creases the expected loss of invention?4 The defense passes the test if it
43. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813,
1829-37 (1984).
44. The common intuition that a patent should reward an inventor in proportion to the social
value of his invention incorrectly focuses on total social benefits rather than net social benefits. Id. at
1821, 1827-28. This common intuition arises in part from mistaking correlation for causation. The
social value of an invention often correlates positively with R&D costs simply because highly valu-
able inventions often cost more to produce than less valuable inventions.
45. "Expected" means the loss is discounted by its probability of occurring. Loss in this
context refers to foregone benefit. Suppose an invention would confer $10 million in net social
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(1) markedly decreases system costs and (2) only marginally increases the
risk that no timely inventor will expect to profit from the invention.
A. System Costs
System costs can be divided into three categories: monopoly loss, rent
dissipation, and miscellaneous costs.
1. Monopoly Loss
Monopoly loss refers to deadweight losses proximately caused by supra-
competitive pricing of the invention. Patents both supply and deny consum-
ers access to (or use of) inventions. Patents supply access by giving
46inventors the incentive to invent in the first place. Without such incentive,
many inventions would never be created or would be long delayed. Once
inventions have been invented, however, patents deny access by maintaining
prices above the competitive level. If the price of the invention is $100 when
protected by patent and $75 when not protected by patent, the patent denies
access to all consumers who value the invention at more than $75 but at less
than $100. This does not represent a pure transfer from consumers to pro-
ducers. It is well known that each dollar of monopoly profit reduces the
consumer surplus more than it increases the producer surplus.
Monopoly also leads to inefficient production. To maintain supra-
competitive prices, monopolists must produce at quantities short of those
necessary to fully exploit the advantages of mass production. That is, by
deliberately restricting output, monopolists fail to wring the most out of the
resources used to produce the invention commercially. Also, monopolists
are less pressured to adopt new ways of producing the invention more effi-
ciently.
benefits, and the probability of failing to incentivize its creation is 10%. In this case, the expected
loss of invention is $1 million. Though not apparent in this simple example, "expected loss" encom-
passes delay of invention as well as permanent loss.
46. Most purported alternatives to the incentive theory of patent law are merely alternatives
to a narrowly conceived formulation of the incentive theory. In the final analysis, these purported
alternatives seldom stray from the basic point that patents enable inventors to profit from invention.
One exception is the portion of Kitch's prospect theory that posits avoidance of redundant effort as a
contributory rationale for the patent system. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcON. 265, 276 (1977); see also Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent
Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REv. 305, 313-16 (1992) (revising Kitch's prospect theory of
the patent system).
47. Patents also deny consumers access to inventions in the future by denying potential in-
ventors access to preexisting inventions. The vast majority of inventions are improvements on
preexisting inventions. Potential inventors must access preexisting inventions in order to improve
them. When access to preexisting inventions is very costly, potential inventors make fewer im-
provement inventions. See generally Grady & Alexander, supra note 46; Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
280 Sci. 698 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEx. L. REV. 989 (1997); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
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2. Rent Dissipation
Rent dissipation includes the increase in R&D costs attributable to pat-
ent races that is not offset by the benefits of getting inventions earlier. Under
current law, patent races are winner-take-all contests. Winner-take-all con-
tests can attract too much investment and too many contestants, for reasons
similar to those underlying the tragedy of the commons. Landes and Posner
analogize patent races to salvaging sunken treasure:
Suppose a sunken ship has a salvage value of $1 million that could be real-
ized at a cost of only $100,000. The potential gain to the salvager-the
economic rent or pure profit from salvaging the sunken ship-is thus
$900,000 if a property right in the sunken ship can be acquired. The com-
petition to realize that gain by acquiring the property right may gobble up
all or most of the potential rent, transforming it into a deadweight social
loss unless the pell-mell competition speeds up the salvage process enough
to produce an increase in present value of the treasure that offsets the
added Cost)4
Similarly, patent races increase R&D costs by encouraging speed and
duplication among rival inventors.49 Speed and duplication result in earlier
invention, but the marginal social costs of earlier invention often exceed the
marginal social benefits. Speed responsible for costs in excess of benefits
will be referred to herein as "haste." Duplication responsible for costs in
excess of benefits will be referred to herein as "redundancy."
Rent dissipation also includes wasteful efforts by competitors to invent
around the patent. The further the patented invention is priced above the com-
petitive level, the more profitable are non-infringing substitutes for the
patented invention and the more incentive competitors have to design products
48. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 16-17; see also id. at 25-29 (analogizing patent race
to a race to claim an uninhabited continent); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY
124 (1968) ("The prospects of monopoly pricing will lead to such a scale of investment in produc-
ing knowledge that it will return only the competitive rate of return on average."); Yoram Barzel,
Optimal liming of Innovations, 50 REV. EcON. & STAT. 348, 349 (1968) ("[C]ompetition among
potential innovators may deprive innovations of all their special economic value."); Giuseppe Dari-
Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, Rents, Dissipation, and Lost Treasures: Rethinking Tullock 's Paradox,
124 PuB. CHOICE 411 (2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=467343.
49. See generally SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATIONS AND INCENTIVES 100-03, 112-14,
120-23 (2004); Barzel, supra note 48; Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial
Structure and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1, 11-12 (1980); Pankaj Tandon, Rivalry and the
Excessive Allocation of Resources to Research, 14 BELL J. ECON. 152 (1983); Urs Fischbacher &
Christian Th6ni, Excess Entry in an Experimental Winner-Take-All Market (Zurich Inst. for Empiri-
cal Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 86, 2002) available at http://ssm.com/abstract=282729;
Roger A. McCain, Optimal Entry in Information Product Sectors (E. Econ. Assoc. Conf., Boston,
Mar. 1996). But cf Christopher Harris & John Vickers, Patent Races and the Persisience of Monop-
oly, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 461 (1985) (stating that in race in which incumbent firm would affirmatively
lose something if challenger won, challenger may anticipate that incumbent will outrace challenger, in
which case challenger will not bother to enter race); Mark R. Patterson, Patent Races with No Entrants
(Fordhan Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 22, 2002), available at http://www.fordham.edu/law/
faculty/patterson/workingpapers/patentraces.pdf (stating that underinvestment in R&D can occur when
an inventor who would have won the race drops out after suffering early setbacks in his research, not
knowing his competitors have suffered similar setbacks).
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that fall just outside the patent's scope. This is inefficient to the extent these
products are inferior substitutes for the patented invention. 0
3. Miscellaneous Costs
Miscellaneous costs is a catchall category for the various social costs
that do not clearly or traditionally fall into the category of monopoly loss or
rent dissipation. Examples of miscellaneous costs include
* the costs of ascertaining the boundaries of patent rights;5'
* the costs of transacting over patent rights;
* the costs attributable to the biasing of R&D toward patentable technol-
ogy and away from unpatentable technology that is nevertheless
socially valuable;
* the costs for patent applicants to prosecute applications through the
Patent Office;
* the costs of running the Patent Office;
* the costs for litigants of pressing and defending patent suits; and
* the costs of running the courts that are attributable to patent litigation.
Miscellaneous costs do not play a key role in the analysis to follow.
They are included largely for purposes of completeness.
B. Kaplow's Test
Our test differs from a test established by Louis Kaplow in his landmark
article on the intersection of patent and antitrust.52 His test, in which "mo-
nopoly loss" apparently stands for all types of system costs, is framed in
terms of a ratio:
Patentee Reward
Monopoly Loss
His test treats the desired magnitude of the incentive as a given. A patent
doctrine passes his test if the doctrine increases the ratio by reducing the
denominator. In other words, Kaplow brackets the question of whether the
magnitude of incentive is right and instead asks whether we can get the
same magnitude of incentive at a lower cost than we are paying. This brack-
eting makes sense in the context of his article, which adopts a bird's eye
view of the patent system that encompasses all classes of invention as op-
posed to, say, one exceptional class of inventions.
50. Races to invent superior substitutes can also be inefficient if rent dissipation is severe.
See generally Grady & Alexander, supra note 46, at 308.
51. See Long, supra note 16, at 468.
52. See Kaplow, supra note 43.
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Our test does not treat the magnitude of the incentive as a given.53 The
reinvention defense could pass our test not only by altering the form of the
incentive but also by reducing the magnitude of the incentive. Thus, our test
cannot be framed in terms of Kaplow's ratio because we cannot say the de-
fense should always increase his ratio.
The defense might pass our test even if it would reduce his ratio. For ex-
ample, the defense passes our test but flunks Kaplow's test when standard,
complete patent exclusivity would provide an above-average expected re-
turn on invention and when the defense would scale back the patent
exclusivity until the expected return on invention dropped from above-
average to average. Expected return and system costs both fall with reduc-
tions in patent exclusivity. With respect to inventions for which complete
patent exclusivity would provide an above-average expected return, the op-
portunity presents itself to scale back the patent exclusivity and, in turn, to
reduce system costs without reducing the expected return below the average.
The average expected return is sufficient provided that, as it is popular and
reasonable to believe, the average return on invention generally exceeds the
necessary minimum to incentivize invention.
Our test further differs from Kaplow's in that his focuses attention on
the patentee's reward rather than the inventors' incentives. Our test focuses
on the inventors' incentives because not all relevant inventors are patentees
and because expected profit is not solely a function of patent exclusivity.
'
IV. THE REINVENTION DEFENSE LOWERS SYSTEM COSTS WITHOUT
DESTROYING NECESSARY INCENTIVE
This Part argues that the reinvention defense characterized in Part II
passes the test established in Part III. Section A below argues that the de-
fense markedly lowers system costs. Section B below argues that the
defense seldom lowers expected revenue below every timely inventor's
costs. To be sure, the defense does lower the expected revenue for reinvent-
ables. Ex ante, an inventor does not know whether she will end up as the
patentee or as the reinventor. If the defense is adopted into law, a reinventor
could compete with whoever ends up as the patentee, thereby breaking up
the patent monopoly into a duopoly. Monopoly profits exceed the collective
profits of duopoly. Thus, from the ex ante perspective of inventors who are
considering reinventables, the defense tends to shrink the pot at the end of
53. Note that, though our test does not take the desired magnitude of the reward as a given, it
does assume that the social benefits exceed the social costs for the invention in question. Thus, this
test is inappropriate for inventions that society would be better off without. It is in this sense that
this paper focuses on system costs rather than the other two costs of invention: the unavoidable
R&D costs inherent in overcoming the technical challenge of the invention, and any negative exter-
nalities resulting from use of the invention.
54. See Vincenzo Denicol6, Patent Races and Optimal Patent Breadth and Length, 44 J.
INDUs. EcON. 249, 253 (1996) (stating that a more general framework considers firms' overall in-
centives to invent rather than patentee firms' patent rents). Inventors also have non-monetary
incentives.
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the rainbow. Section B.1 argues, however, that the shrinkage is moderate.
Section B.2 argues that, without the shrinkage, the pot is too big.
A. The Reinvention Defense Lowers System Costs
1. The Reinvention Defense Reduces Monopoly Loss
The defense reduces monopoly loss in a straightforward manner. In
cases in which reinvention occurs, the reinventor (or his assignee) will typi-
cally sell the patented invention in competition with the patentee, thereby
increasing commercial output of the invention and decreasing its price. In-
creased output and decreased price mean increased consumer access.
2. The Reinvention Defense Reduces Rent Dissipation
The defense reduces rent dissipation, though not always in a straight-
forward manner. Haste and redundancy can occur at three stages: (1) before
anyone has created the invention ("pre-invention stage"); (2) after the first
inventor has created the invention but before she has notified a potential re-
inventor of it ("submarine stage"); and (3) after a reinventor has reinvented
in a timely manner ("commercialization stage").
By reducing the expected reward for reinventables, the defense reduces
haste and redundancy at the pre-invention and submarine stages in a
straightforward manner. Specifically, by reducing the expected reward for
reinventables, the defense causes fewer and less zealous inventors to pursue
reinventables, thereby reducing the number and intensity of patent races.
The defense further reduces haste and redundancy at the submarine
stage in a less straightforward manner-by shortening the stage. Recall that
reinvention qualifies as a defense only if the reinventor completes the inven-
tion before receiving notice that someone else already completed it. If the
defense is adopted into law, first inventors will try to safeguard their patent
monopolies by issuing notice of their inventions before would-be reinven-
tors can complete the invention. The notice will apprise would-be
reinventors that they have already lost the patent race and are too late to
qualify for the defense. 5  These would-be reinventors will terminate their
hasty and redundant work on the inventions and will turn their attention to
other projects. Under current law, first inventors have little incentive to issue
notice of their inventions promptly.
55. See also Patterson, supra note 49, at 12-19. In Patterson's model, an inventor who oth-
erwise would have won the race may drop out after suffering early setbacks, not knowing that her
competitors have suffered similar setbacks. This is another way of saying that patent races occasion-
ally generate too little duplication rather than too much. Nevertheless, the reinvention defense
comports with Patterson's remedies for this exceptional problem. He identifies three types of
changes in the law one might consider: those that provide race participants with information about
the progress of their competitors; those that encourage competitors to provide information to each
other about whether they are still in the race; and those that mitigate the winner-take-all nature of
patent races by providing some reward to those who do not finish first. The reinvention defense
would bring about all three of these changes.
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Harder to assess are the effects of the defense at the commercialization
stage. Under current law, patents deter reinventors from commercializing the
patented inventions. If the defense is adopted into law, reinvention will oc-
cur less often overall, but in cases in which it does occur, reinventors and
patentees will both be able to exploit the patented inventions. Their competi-
tive efforts to do so may qualify as hasty and redundant. To reiterate, the
defense makes reinvention less common in the first place, which reduces the
absolute number--compared to the status quo--of cases in which reinven-
tors stand ready to commercialize the patented inventions. But the defense
could increase the relative proportion of those cases in which reinventors
move forward with commercializing the patented inventions.
This leads to the question: is haste or redundancy at the commercializa-
tion stage as significant as haste or redundancy at the pre-invention and
submarine stages? Probably not. Haste can arise at the commercialization
stage because the patentee and reinventor both have an incentive to capture
the reputational and branding advantages of being first to market.16 In many
cases, however, the patentee enjoys too big a head start for the reinventor to
have any hope of being first to market. Not only will the patentee often en-
joy a big head start, the patentee can also scale up faster because, unlike the
reinventor, she can coordinate multiparty production by licensing out the
invention. 7
Redundancy can arise at the commercialization stage when the patentee
and reinventor duplicate their efforts to commercialize. Note, however, the
indivisibility of duplication (which typically has a bad connotation) and
competition (which typically has a good connotation). Competition simulta-
neously entails inherent costs in the form of duplication and generates social
benefits in the form of increased productive and allocative efficiency. Dupli-
cation is properly regarded as redundant only when (and only to the extent
that) the costs of duplication inherent in competition exceed the benefits of
competition."s
For IP, the inherent costs of duplication at the pre-invention and subma-
rine stages tend to exceed the inherent costs of duplication at the
commercialization stage. A defining characteristic of IP is that, compared to
56. The first-mover advantage is more important than the patent right in some industries. See
generally Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Devel-
opment, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and
Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. ScI. 173 (1986); Boldrin & Levine, Monopoly, supra
note 7, at 24-27; Andrew Farlow, Dep't of Econ. & Oriel Coll., Univ. of Oxford, Presentation at the
Access to Medicines and the Financing of Innovations in Health Care Conference, The Program on
Science, Technology, and Global Development at The Earth Institute at Columbia University, Costs
of Monopoly Pricing Under Patent Protection (Dec. 4, 2003), available at http://www.earthinstitute.
columbia.edu/cgsd/documents/farlow2.ppt.
57. See discussion supra Section II.E.
58. But cf Barzel, supra note 8, at 352. Under the assumptions of Barzel's model, including
continuously rising demand for the invention over time, "the basic wasteful effect of competition
lies not in duplicating the use of resources but in using these resources prematurely, when they
would have earned a higher return elsewhere in the economy." Id.
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tangible property, it has a high ratio of fixed costs to variable costs. 9 The
fixed costs of invention consist more or less of the costs of R&D, which are
incurred during the pre-invention and submarine stages. The variable costs
of invention consist of the costs of commercializing the invention, i.e., the
costs of producing, marketing, and selling the product or service embodying
the invention. The variable costs of invention are incurred during the com-
mercialization stage. Because the fixed costs of invention tend to be high
and the variable costs low, the inherent costs of duplicating the fixed costs
of invention tend to exceed the inherent costs of duplicating the variable
costs of invention. This is especially true for information goods with very
low variable costs, such as software.
In sum, the defense clearly decreases haste and redundancy in the first
and second of the three stages in which haste and redundancy can occur.
Unclear is whether the defense decreases or increases haste and redundancy
at the third stage. However, even if the defense increases haste and redun-
dancy at the third stage, that increase appears to be outweighed by the
decrease at the first and second stages.60
3. The Reinvention Defense Reduces Miscellaneous Costs
The defense probably reduces miscellaneous costs overall. For example, the
defense reduces legal costs by lowering the number of patent suits. Recent
scholarship suggests that many if not most patent suits are against independ-
ent inventors as opposed to pirates or firms that attempted to invent around
the patent. 6' The defense further reduces legal costs by allowing at least
some reinventors to commercialize their inventions without first obtaining
elaborate clearance opinions from patent counsel, opinions that under cur-
59. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 23.
60. But cf Kitch, supra note 46. Kitch believes that redundant efforts to exploit an invention
commercially are very costly. According to his well-known "prospect theory," patent rights are
doled out to the first "prospector" to identify the inventive prospect, much the way mineral rights are
doled out to the first prospector to identify a mineral deposit. Patents do not, Kitch argues, merely
encourage the initial creation of the invention.
Another major function of patents is to encourage efficient investment in the perfection and
commercialization of the invention. The exclusivity conferred by the patent enables the first pros-
pector to coordinate perfection and commercialization efficiently, thereby encouraging the first
prospector to invest in bringing the invention to market while simultaneously discouraging rivals
from doing so.
Few scholars, however, accept prospect theory. It does not explain the case law. See, e.g.,
Grady & Alexander, supra note 46, at 317. Moreover, prospect theory is belied by the fact that pat-
ents confer only the right to exclude and not an affirmative right to exploit a patch of technology. In
other words, patent law allows subsequent inventors to obtain patents on improvements within the
prospect. For example, if inventor A patents the light bulb, inventor B is free to patent an improved
light bulb filament. A cannot adopt B's filament without first obtaining a license from B.
61. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes, 96
AMER. ECON. REV. 77 (2006); James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion
(Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 05-18, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=831685.
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rent law range in price from perhaps $10,000 to $150,000 each. In addi-
tion, by reducing the expected return on reinventables, the defense mitigates
the bias in R&D toward patentable technology.
B. The Reinvention Defense Seldom Lowers the
Reward below Break-Even Point
Let "reward C" be the reward for an invention afforded by complete pat-
ent exclusivity, that is, the reward inventors expect under current law. Let
"reward R" be the lower reward for an invention that inventors would expect
were the reinvention defense adopted into law. If reward C causes an inven-
tion to be reinvented-if reward C incentivizes multiple inventors to cross
the same finish line neck and neck-it is more than tempting to conclude
that reward R would have been sufficient (provided it were only moderately
lower than reward C) to incentivize at least one of the inventors to cross the
63finish line without undue delay. This is indeed my conclusion, but I cannot
jump to it. Reward C might be the break-even point below which no inven-
tor would be incentivized to cross the finish line without undue delay. Or,
reward C might exceed the inventors' break-even point by only a tiny mar-
gin, in which case reward R could lie beneath the break-even point. This
Section argues that, with respect to reinventables, reward C exceeds the
break-even point by a large margin and that reward R exceeds the break-
even point by a small but still clear margin.
Subsection (1) below argues that reward R is only moderately lower than
reward C. Subsection (2) argues that, with respect to reinventables, reward C
provides a considerably higher-than-average return on invention. Note that,
consistent with "moderately" being an inexact term, it does not strictly fol-
low from the arguments of Subsections (1) and (2) that reward R exceeds an
inventor's break-even point. I cannot prove reward R exceeds an inventor's
break-even point. I can only show that the probability is high that reward R
exceeds an inventor's break-even point in the vast majority of cases. Such
indeterminacy is the norm in all areas of IP law. All IP doctrines are based
on informed intuitions about the magnitudes of competing effects, not on
close reasoning from hard data.64
62. This range of prices is based on my experience from practicing between 2001 to 2004 at
a large firm in Washington DC.
63. Can we analogize to foot races? Consider marathons. In 2005, rewards were $100,000
for the men's winner of the New York Marathon, $25,000 for the men's winner of the Honolulu
Marathon, $15,000 for the men's winner of the Baltimore Marathon, and $0 for the men's winner of
the Marine Corps Marathon. The New York reward is immoderately higher than these other rewards.
Yet, the New York winner was only 2.5 minutes faster than the Honolulu winner, 4 minutes faster
than the Baltimore winner, and 10.5 minutes faster than the Marine Corps winner. A similar pattern
holds for other marathons such as the Boston, Las Vegas, and Houston marathons. Of course, people
typically run, but do not typically invent, for reasons that are largely non-pecuniary.
64. Cf George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property, 8
RES. L. & EcON. 19, 24 (1986) (concluding not much); William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual
Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 17 (Stephen R.
Munzer ed., 2001).
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1. Reward R Is Only Moderately Lower Than Reward C
The defense drops the expected reward for reinventables from reward C
to reward R. The drop from reward C to reward R is moderate, for the fol-
lowing three reasons.
First, even when a reinventor breaks up the patentee's monopoly, some
degree of market exclusivity will usually remain. The duopoly shared by the
patentee and the reinventor will usually be a Cournot duopoly that maintains
prices above the competitive level. Given his limited rights, a reinventor
cannot increase output freely. If he increases output until he competes away
all of the patentee's profits, the patentee will have no incentive to enforce
the patent against third parties or to pay the periodic maintenance fees nec-
essary to keep the patent in force. If the patentee stops enforcing the patent
or stops paying maintenance fees, the invention will effectively fall into the
public domain, rendering the reinventor's defense worthless. In any event,
even if a reinventor wanted to compete away all profits, he may be unable to
do so: a reinventor cannot increase output as easily as a patentee because he
cannot coordinate multiparty production by licensing out the invention.
Second, the drop from reward C to reward R is also moderate because
the defense reduces the risk of inventive activity by reducing the variance in
65its payoffs. Under current law, a reinventor gets no rights to the invention
and may be sued by the patentee. Thus, inventors ex ante face the prospect
of spending enormous sums on R&D only to end up scuttling the whole
project. If the defense is adopted, inventors will take some comfort in the
prospect of receiving the defense as a consolation prize. This effect par-
tially 66 offsets the defense's overall tendency to decrease the incentive to
pursue reinventables.
Third, the drop from reward C to reward R is moderate because it is
somewhat self-moderating. As explained earlier, reducing the expected re-
ward lowers the number of inventors who will pursue a reinventable in the
first place. With fewer inventors, an inventor who stays in the race has better
odds of winning the reward and not having to share it with a reinventor.
65. In his classic article on invention, Kenneth Arrow suggested risk aversion leads to under-
investment in invention. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 610-14 (1962). Invention is indeed a risky activity. Not only is technological success far from
assured, financial success is the exception. It is not clear, however, that risk aversion has actually led
to under-investment in invention in general. A stronger argument can be made that risk aversion has
biased investment away from especially risky inventions toward less risky inventions. See, e.g..
Cabral, supra note 31 (arguing R&D is biased toward non-optimally low risk projects); see also
Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New Esti-
mates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH EcON. 151, 151 (2003) (half of the cost of
developing a new drug is the increased cost of capital attributable to the high risk of failure in drug
development).
66. Occasionally, the defense's attenuation of risk may wholly offset or even outweigh its
attenuation of the promise of exclusivity. That is, in exceptional cases, the increase in incentives due
to the reduction in risk could equal or exceed the decrease in incentives due to the reduction in pat-
ent protection.
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Indeed, reducing the expected reward "on paper" can occasionally in-
crease the expected reward for the inventor who stays in. Suppose, for
example, the following: Inventor A can develop a patentable invention at an
R&D cost of $500,000, and the invention will yield $4 million in revenue
after discounting to present value. However, the initial expected profit of
$3.5 million will attract rival inventor B, thereby starting a race. The race
will result in invention one year earlier than otherwise but will drive up
R&D to $1.5 million for each of the rival inventors. If A and B face an equal
chance of winning the patent, the revised expected profit for each will be
$500,000 [($4 million / 2)-$1.5 million], plus the reduction in the present-
value discount attributable to realizing profits one year earlier. The rent dis-
sipation is $2.5 million 67 minus the social benefits of public access to the
invention one year earlier.
Now suppose that a newly adopted patent doctrine will decrease the pat-
ent exclusivity available for the invention so that it yields $2 million in
revenue instead of $4 million. The initial expected profit is therefore only
$1.5 million, which is less attractive to inventor B than the initial expected
profit of $3.5 million in the previous scenario. If the initial expected profit
of $1.5 million is insufficient to attract B, A's expected profit will remain
$1.5 million, which well exceeds the revised expected profit of $500,000 (or
more) in the previous scenario. Also, rent dissipation will be far lower than
in the previous scenario unless achieving the invention one year earlier pro-
vides freakishly high social benefits.68
2. Reward C Is Too High for Reinventables
The occurrence of reinvention implies a high probability that reward C is
excessive. Recall the Bayesian point in the Introduction: if no inventor ever
creates a given invention, the probability is very low that reward C is exces-
sive for that invention. If only one inventor creates the invention, the
probability is higher (but still not high overall) that reward C is excessive. If
two or more inventors independently create the invention at about the same
time, the probability is high that reward C is excessive.
Reward C is excessive when it exceeds the minimum reward necessary
to stimulate creation of the particular invention. Reward C tends to be ex-
cessive when it exceeds the average reward for invention. (This assumes that
the average reward is not systematically too low to begin with, i.e., that the
average reward is not already so low that it under-incentivizes many valu-
able inventions.) Reward C also tends to be excessive when the minimum
reward necessary for the particular invention is lower than the minimum
reward necessary for the average invention.
67. $2.5 million is the difference between what the total R&D costs ended up being ($3
million) and what they started out as ($500,000).
68. Revenue (as opposed to profit) is a proxy for the social benefits of an invention. Thus, if
the total revenue the inventor could ever get from the invention were only $2-4 million, the social
benefits of getting the invention one year earlier would almost never exceed $2.5 million.
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In other words, reward C is excessive for inventions that promise inven-
tors either unusually low costs or unusually high revenue. This situation can
arise when, for example, an abrupt social or technological change suddenly
lowers the cost of an input into an invention, thereby transforming it over-
night from a high-cost invention into a low-cost invention. Or, an abrupt
social or technological change can create demand for an invention that was
low cost to begin with. Innumerable non-existent inventions have low costs
but are never brought into existence because they are of no value to anyone.
If demand for the invention suddenly appears, multiple inventors may invent• 69
it more or less simultaneously. Consider Amazon.com's infamous one-
click patent, which covers website transactions in which, after creating an
account, the consumer buys the goods with one click rather than having to
click through several pages to check oUt.70 The one-click method posed only
a trivial technical challenge (low cost of invention) but did not come into
being until e-commerce abruptly emerged.
Alternatively, reward C may be excessive because the supply of the in-
vention is inelastic. Technological and other exogenous forces can channel
inventors toward the same end despite their initial attempts to pursue differ-
ent ends. Sometimes there is only one feasible solution to a technological
problem, so that inventors are forced by the laws of nature to merge onto the
same road. In short, to some degree the invention may be inevitable.7
In summary, the sheer fact that an invention is--or is likely to be-
reinvented implies that reward C is too high for that invention. It does not
strictly follow that reward R is high enough. The fact that reward C incentiv-
izes multiple inventors to create the invention contemporaneously does not
prove that reward R-even if it is only moderately below reward C-will
suffice to incentivize at least one inventor to create the invention in a timely
manner. What does follow, however, is that the odds are good that reward R
will suffice.
V. OBJECTIONS TO THE REINVENTION DEFENSE
A. Inventors Will Learn to Issue Notice Immediately
Again, a reinventor cannot qualify for the defense if he reinvents after
the first inventor issues sufficient notice of her invention. Accordingly, if the
defense is adopted into law, first inventors will have an incentive to issue
notice before would-be reinventors can reinvent. What if first inventors
adapt to the defense by learning to issue notice immediately (as little as a
69. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 304.
70. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997).
71. See OGBURN, supra note 10, at 80-89; Ogburn & Thomas, supra note 10; Zeira, supra
note 31. Zeira's model drops the standard assumption that the set of potential inventions in each
period is unlimited. His model suggests that, when the assumption is dropped, the problem of rent
dissipation and monopoly loss is even worse than standard models suggest. With regard to policy,
Zeira tentatively suggests we should provide more support for inventors who pursue inventions with
the lowest probabilities of success. Id. at 25-26.
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• 72few weeks) after completing invention? Rarely does a reinventor complete
invention immediately after the first inventor completes it. Thus, if first in-
ventors learn to issue notice immediately, reinventors will rarely qualify for
the defense. As such, the defense will do little to reduce monopoly loss. The
defense will also do little to reduce ex ante incentives to pursue reinvent-
ables. If inventors ex ante know they will issue notice immediately after they
complete the invention, they know the odds are very low that anyone will
complete reinvention in time to qualify for the defense.
This argument is correct. To the extent inventors learn to issue notice
immediately, the defense will reduce neither monopoly loss nor the number
and intensity of patent races. To the same extent, however, the defense will
reduce the duration of patent races. The sooner first inventors issue notice,
the sooner trailing inventors will find out they have lost and terminate their
hasty and redundant R&D. Thus, even if all inventors learn to issue notice
immediately, the defense should still lead to a state of affairs superior to the
status quo-provided, as will generally be true, the benefits of shortening
patent races exceed the costs of issuing notice immediately.
7 3
B. The Reinvention Defense Could Exacerbate Some Patent Races
One could argue that the defense will cause inventors to race faster in
order not only to win the patent but to do so with greater lead time. That is,
under current law inventors are satisfied to win by an inch; the defense may
give them an incentive to win by a mile.
However, the strategy of winning by a mile is inferior to the strategy of
issuing notice promptly after winning by an inch. The strategies are equally
effective at shutting the window of reinvention for a trailing inventor, but the
strategy of winning by a mile tends to be much more expensive than the
strategy of issuing notice promptly after winning by an inch. Thus, rational
inventors will choose the latter strategy.
Compare, for instance, the following two cases: In case one, inventors A
and B are in the middle of a patent race. In terms of progress on the inven-
tion, A is about three months ahead of B. To prevent B from qualifying for
the reinvention defense, A steps up the pace of her R&D, increases her lead,
and ends up crossing the invention finish line six months before B can cross
it. Yet, A issues notice of her invention five months later in her traditional
unrushed fashion. In case two, A does not step up the pace of R&D. Rather,
A maintains her three-month lead throughout the race, but issues notice two
months after she crosses the finish line rather than five months after she
crosses it. In both cases, B's reinvention window is shut one month before
72. Inventors would be hard pressed to issue notice within less than a few weeks. It takes
time for them to extract the relevant disclosure from their notebooks, to organize it, and to make
sure it discloses no more proprietary material than necessary.
73. This proviso will generally be satisfied because the benefits of terminating hasty and
redundant R&D that would otherwise occur generally exceed the costs of sending letters to potential
reinventors (actual notice) or publishing the invention via, for example, a press release (constructive
notice).
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he can complete reinvention. A's costs, however, are likely to be much
higher in the first case than the second.
C. Reinvention Can Be Faked
An early version of this paper purported to be descriptive rather than
normative. It aimed to explain why the reinvention defense does not exist in
patent law rather than to argue it should exist. The purported descriptive
explanation is that the defense would open the door to fraudulent claims of
reinvention, which would degrade incentives for all inventions, not just for
inventions that face a significant chance of being legitimately reinvented.
On closer inspection, the fraud explanation is unconvincing. To perpe-
trate a fraudulent reinvention defense, the phony reinventor would have to
commit perjury and/or forge records. Advocacy and self-serving belief are
not especially rare among members of the inventive community, but outright
fraud is. That community consists of scientists and engineers who if any-
thing are probably more earnest than the general population. Accordingly,
fraudulent attempts to establish first-inventor status are quite rare. 74 It is true
that reinvention is somewhat easier to fake than first invention is.7 On the
other hand, a phony first inventor stands to gain more today from success-
fully faking first invention than a phony reinventor will gain from
successfully faking reinvention. To the extent the overall risk-reward calcu-
lation for phony first invention approximates or is better than the overall
risk-reward calculation for phony reinvention, the fact that fraudulent first
invention is rare today suggests that fraudulent reinvention will be rare if the
defense is adopted into law. In any event, if fraudulent reinvention turns out
to be a problem, we can respond by increasing the evidentiary requirements
that reinventors must satisfy to qualify for the defense. For example, we can
place the burden on reinventors to provide corroborated evidence that they
reinvented before receiving notice.
Nor will the danger of phony reinvention encourage secrecy among first
inventors. The benefit to first inventors of issuing early notice--early shut-
ting of the reinvention window for legitimate potential reinventors-
outweighs the risk to first inventors that issuing early notice will help phony
reinventors to fake reinvention. Issuing early notice will seldom help phony
74. Consider some casual evidence for this proposition. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. pat-
ent applications are filed each year, and the Patent Office has issued millions of them as patents over
the years. Yet, one can count on a single hand the number of decisions in which the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences has accused a party to a contest over inventorship (an interference) of
fraudulently attempting to establish first inventor status.
75. In most legal disputes over who was first to invent ("priority contests"), neither party
initially knows the other's date of invention. Each party must disclose his date of invention to the
court or Patent Office before he knows the other's date. This discourages fraud because at the time
when the fraud would need to occur-at the outset of the priority contest-the phony first inventor
does not know the date to beat. In contrast, a phony reinventor would know the date to beat: the date
she received actual or constructive notice of the first inventor's invention. The phony reinventor
would merely have to persuade the court or Patent Office she completed reinvention at least one day
before that date of notice.
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reinventors any more than issuing late notice will. A phony reinventor can
backdate his lab records to a date before late notice just as easily-in fact
more easily-than he can backdate them to a date before early notice.
D. Patent Monopolies Can Be Reinstated through Bargaining
Timely reinvention breaks up the patent monopoly into a duopoly. How-
ever, nothing in the regime of limited transferability, discussed in Section
II.E, prevents the reinventor and patentee from cobbling the patent monop-
oly back together. Through Coasian bargaining, the reinventor and the
patentee can transfer their rights to the party who can best exploit those
rights. When the patentee can best exploit the patent monopoly, the reinven-
tor can assign his defense to the patentee. When the reinventor can best
exploit the patent monopoly, the patentee can assign or license her patent to
the reinventor. When a third party can best exploit the patent monopoly, the
patentee and the reinventor can transfer their respective rights to the third
party. In short, absent bargaining breakdown and high transaction costs, the
patentee's patent rights and the reinventor's defense rights should find their
way to their most highly valued use, facilitating monopoly.
If reinstatement of monopolies became the norm, the defense would do
little to reduce monopoly loss and ex ante incentives to pursue reinventables.
Reinstatement of monopolies would also generate transaction costs not in-
cuffed under current law. Nevertheless, the prospect of reinstatement is not
especially troublesome. If reinstatement threatens to become the norm, we
can nip it in the bud by tweaking the regime of limited transferability to for-
bid reinventors and patentees from transferring their rights to each other or
to the same third party. We could, for example, declare that reinstating a
patent monopoly in this way violates the antitrust laws or renders the patent
unenforceable under the doctrine of patent misuse.
CONCLUSION
The incentives necessary to stimulate invention vary across inventions.
In an ideal world, incentives would be calibrated individually for each in-
vention and would never exceed the minimum necessary to bring each
invention into being at an opportune time. Incentives above the minimum
impose deadweight losses. One deadweight loss comes in the form of di-
minished consumer access due to prices of inventions being higher above
the competitive level than they have to be to stimulate the initial creation of
the inventions. Another deadweight loss comes in the form of increased
R&D costs that do not translate into equal benefits for consumers. When
multiple inventors enter a race, each incurs the costs of invention. And when
only one inventor can win, each is encouraged to rush and to incur the costs
of invention early in time rather than waiting for the costs to fall as they
normally will.
Under current law, an inventor's incentive to invent is a function of her
expected return under complete patent exclusivity weighted by the
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probability of obtaining that exclusivity. If the reinvention defense is
adopted into law, an inventor's incentive will be a function of her expected
return under varying degrees of exclusivity, weighted by the probability of
obtaining each degree of exclusivity. In general, her incentive will fall with a
rise in the probability of timely reinvention. When that probability is high,
she might drop out of the race. Her dropping out is usually good for society
provided at least one other inventor stays in. If one inventor stays in, the
invention gets made and the costs of invention are incurred only once. The
risk is that no inventor stays in or that the invention is significantly delayed.
This risk appears to be minimal and worth accepting.
